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Evaluating the innovation box tax policy 
instrument in the Netherlands, 2007–13
Pierre Mohnen,* Arthur Vankan,** and Bart Verspagen***
Abstract: Patent boxes are tax incentive schemes aimed at stimulating research and development 
(R&D) in firms by providing favourable tax rates to profits that can be linked to a specific immate-
rial asset, such as a patent. Because these profits are often hard to separate from other firm profits, 
patent boxes have been argued to be prone to tax shifting of  firms, and tax competition between 
nations, as they might shift the location of  the profits without affecting the location of  R&D activi-
ties. Whether or not this occurs may also depend on conditions set in the patent box. We evaluate 
the innovation box policy instrument in the Netherlands, which is essentially a patent box, but 
without the formal requirement of  a patent. We ask whether the innovation box has an effect on 
local R&D investment of  the firm (‘additionality’), thereby putting the hypothesis of  tax shifting 
to the test. We find that the innovation box indeed has a positive effect on R&D investment, but 
the average firm that uses the policy tends to use only a part of  the tax advantage for extra R&D 
investment.
Keywords: R&D policy, R&D tax incentives, patent boxes, tax shifting
JEL classification: O38, H26 O52
I. Introduction
Tax incentives for research and development activities are a popular form of innovation 
policy. Straathof et al. (2014) conclude that in 2014 all member states of the EU, except 
Germany and Estonia, applied a tax instrument to stimulate R&D. These instruments 
come in many different forms (we discuss a brief  taxonomy below). One particular form 
is the patent box, which provides a special (low) corporate income tax rate for profits 
that are the results of immaterial assets (patents and other intellectual property rights 
that result from R&D, such as plant breeders’ rights). The idea is that lower taxes on 
future (expected) profits from R&D will make R&D investments more attractive.
Griffith et  al. (2014), Alstadsæter et  al. (2015), and Evers et  al. (2015) argue that 
patent boxes stimulate tax competition between (European) nations, possibly leading 
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to tax havens and eroded tax bases. Evers et al. (2015) show that in 2014, 12 members 
of the EU had a patent box measure. Other tax incentive schemes may be less decisive 
in terms of tax competition between nations, for example because they work on R&D 
activities undertaken by researchers that are not as easily moved between nations as the 
profits on which patent boxes operate.
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of patent boxes, and based on micro data, 
is scarce. Straathof et al. (2014) extensively survey the evaluation studies on R&D tax 
incentive measures and are unable to include any study on one of the patent box meas-
ures in Europe. De Rassenfosse (2015) argues that patent boxes will have little effect on 
R&D because they target the back end of the innovation process, but he does not con-
duct an econometric analysis. Alstadsæter et al. (2015) do analyse patent box measures, 
but do not have any micro data. Therefore, their conclusions relate to the aggregate, 
between-country level and cannot yield any conclusion on the question of whether the 
patent box schemes effectively incentivize firms to undertake more R&D in the locality 
where they obtain the tax credit. Yet an answer to this question is an important argu-
ment in the debate about tax competition between nations and the potential role that 
patent boxes play in this process.
We present a micro-econometric analysis of  the innovation box tax incentive 
scheme in the Netherlands, for the period 2007–13. The innovation box started out 
as a patent box, but was broadened to include R&D activities without a patent or 
other formal property right in 2010. We estimate the effect of  the innovation box 
in terms of  the extra R&D that firms perform (the ‘additionality’ of  the policy) as 
a result of  the use of  the policy, and compare this to the forgone taxes. This yields 
a so-called ‘bang-for-the-buck’ (BFTB) measure that summarizes the effectiveness 
of  the policy, and which can be seen as an indicator for the degree of  additional-
ity. Our results indicate that the BFTB is positive, i.e. the innovation box effectively 
stimulates R&D, but is smaller than 1, i.e. the extra R&D is less than the forgone 
tax income. We discuss the implications of  this finding for the debate about tax 
competition below.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we briefly review some 
relevant literature. This includes a brief  discussion of the special nature of patent box 
tax measures, and how these affect the probability of tax shifting and tax competition. 
From this, we also derive our main research question, which is to investigate whether 
the measured effects of the Dutch innovation box actually indicate that tax shifting is a 
problem. Section III briefly describes the innovation box policy measure, while section 
IV introduces our econometric approach. The data is described in section V. Section 
VI presents the estimation results, including the BFTB for various years and various 
specifications. The final section VII concludes.
II. A brief literature survey
Straathof et al. (2014) present a number of dimensions on which tax incentive schemes 
for R&D can be distinguished. One dimension is the type of tax that the scheme oper-
ates on. This is usually the corporate income tax, but can also be based on social security 
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box, firms can also use the so-called WBSO measure,1 which allows them deduct an 
amount from the employer’s social security contributions on behalf  of their employees. 
This scheme lowers wage costs for R&D.
A second dimension is whether the tax credit works on the total amount of R&D 
that the firm performs (level-based), or the additional R&D as compared to a base 
period (incremental). Level-based schemes may have an important deadweight loss, 
which means that R&D that would have been carried out without the policy scheme is 
also supported. Increment-based schemes are arguably less sensitive to this, and there-
fore may be associated with a larger policy effect per euro of forgone taxes. But even in 
this case the deadweight loss is not zero, as some of the increment may have occurred 
without the policy.
A final, third dimension is the type of firms that are eligible for the policy instru-
ment. Often, tax credit schemes are generic, i.e. all firms can use them. In other cases, 
the scheme can be aimed at young firms, or at small and medium-sized firms (SMEs). 
Straathof et al. (2014, p. 21) conclude that:
[i]n some . . . countries . . . SMEs tend to respond more strongly to the support 
for R&D, while the reverse was found in other countries . . . [t]here is some evi-
dence that the impact for start-up firms can exceed the average impact, but in 
general, there is not much evidence on how effectiveness of tax incentives varies 
with firm age.
R&D tax credits are generally more generous for SMEs because they are more likely to 
be liquidity constrained, and various studies have shown that SMEs are more respon-
sive in their R&D expenditure to R&D tax credits (e.g. Hægeland and Møen (2007) for 
Norway; Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros (2008) for Spain; Lokshin and Mohnen (2012) 
for the Netherlands).
R&D tax measures have been evaluated using a range of econometric methods 
(Ientile and Mairesse (2009) provide an early survey). One approach is based on the so-
called user-cost of R&D (e.g. Lokshin and Mohnen (2012); an early survey is provided 
by Hall and Van Reenen (2000)). This approach takes R&D as the dependent variable 
and includes the user cost of R&D (which varies over time and between firms, in par-
ticular with respect to the tax incentive scheme) as an independent variable. By iden-
tifying the effect of the tax credit on the user costs of R&D, the effect of the policy in 
terms of extra R&D can be calculated. Lokshin and Mohnen (2012) estimate the effect 
of the Dutch WBSO, and find a positive BFTB<1. Mulkay and Mairesse (2013) find a 
similar effect for France in an ex-ante evaluation of the 2008 reform, which replaced the 
incremental R&D with a level-based R&D tax credit.
A different approach is to estimate the effect of the policy in a more direct way, by 
using a model that distinguishes firms that use the policy from a control group that does 
not use the policy. This estimates the treatment effect of the policy, for which a range 
of econometric approaches can be used, such as difference-in-differences, and matching 
methods (which are also the methods that we use). Cornet and Vroomen (2005) use a 
1 WBSO stands for ‘Wet Bevordering Speur- en Ontwikkelingswerk’, in full ‘Wet Vermindering Afdracht 
Loonbelasting en Premie Volksverzekering, Onderdeel Speur- en Ontwikkelingswerk’ (see de Jong and 
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difference-in-differences method to estimate the effect of the Dutch WBSO, and find a 
positive BFTB<1. Duguet (2012) uses matching and binary regressions for France, and 
finds a BFTB approximately equal to 1.
A common problem in the econometric evaluation of the tax credit schemes lies in 
various kinds of endogeneity. In addition to the endogeneity leading to a selection bias, 
which we discuss below, there is the effect that the policy may have on R&D costs, in par-
ticular wages. When the tax incentive scheme is widely used, it will increase the demand 
for R&D workers, and hence may drive up the wage rate. This raises R&D expenditures 
through a price rather than a volume effect. Lokshin and Mohnen (2013) find such a 
wage effect for the Netherlands and incorporate it in the estimate of the policy effect.
The literature points to the possibility that the specific form of the patent box may 
lead to tax shifting behaviour of firms, and tax competition between countries, because 
in this particular form of policy, the tax advantage is linked not to R&D activities but 
to the profits that result from R&D. As Straathof et al. (2014, p. 45) put it:
Patent boxes . . . offer a large scope for tax planning by firms. They are also part 
of the strategy of at least some countries to increase tax revenues from foreign 
companies. Especially for companies with many patents, it can be very difficult 
to assess what part of a company’s income is derived from which patent. This 
leaves much room for companies and governments to bargain on how much tax 
has to be paid.
Alstadsæter et al. (2015) argue that this can be influenced by the specific design of the 
patent box. They point out that some countries require that the R&D underlying the 
immaterial asset used for the tax advantage is performed locally. Also, some countries 
rule out the use of bought immaterial assets. Both requirements will tend to limit the 
possibilities for tax-shifting behaviour by using a patent box. In the Dutch innovation 
box measure that we evaluate, both these requirements are implemented.
The specific nature of the patent box measures makes them an interesting case for inves-
tigation. Alstadsæter et al. (2015) use country-level data to test whether the existence of 
a patent box policy instrument, and the characteristics of this instrument, are correlated 
to the level of innovative activity (R&D and patents) in the country. Their conclusions 
‘confirm [the] fears [that the patent box] could exert a significant effect on patent location 
without any change in the real research activity, targeting only the tax benefits’(p. 23).
Our micro-econometric analysis of the Dutch case is aimed at finding out whether 
these fears are also realistic for a case where there is a requirement that the firm devel-
oped the immaterial asset used for the tax credit itself. Because of difficulties in assign-
ing profits to a specific R&D project or immaterial asset, this requirement may be 
ineffective. The evidence that we provide is, to our knowledge, the first evaluation of a 
patent box measure based on a micro-econometric method.
III. The innovation box
The innovation box measure is a tax instrument that aims to incentivize firms to per-
form more R&D and to perform this R&D in the Netherlands. Stimulating R&D is the 
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this is expected to contribute to innovation and the perceived broad economic benefits of 
innovation. The instrument works on the corporate income tax, and gives firms a lower 
rate for profits that are the result of immaterial assets. The measure started (in 2007) as 
a patent box, i.e. the only immaterial asset that was allowed was a patent. In 2010 it was 
renamed to innovation box, as the formal patent requirement had been dropped. For 
profits from immaterial assets, the firm pays 4 per cent tax if  its marginal normal rate is 
20 per cent, and 5 per cent if  its marginal normal rate is 25 per cent. The normal rate is 
progressive (20 or 25 per cent), and therefore marginal rates differ between firms.
The innovation box is a generic measure that can be used by all firms (also foreign 
firms active in the Netherlands), but a number of entry criteria apply. The most impor-
tant one is that the firm must have a patent, a plant breeder’s right, or formally recog-
nized (by the tax office) R&D activities. The firm must also generate the immaterial 
asset itself, i.e. it cannot buy it or have the R&D done externally. There is also a thresh-
old profit level, which is equal to the investment (i.e. the lower rate only applies to prof-
its net of the investment).
Because it is difficult to estimate the exact share of the firm’s profits that stems from 
the immaterial asset, the tax office offers a number of accounting standards to formally 
determine the profit amount to which the lower rate applies. This can be done on a 
‘per-asset’ basis if  the accounting practice of the firm allows for identifying profits from 
individual assets of R&D projects. Another method is the ‘peeling method’, where the 
firm identifies a number of core functions that are essential to the main activities of the 
firm. A part of the total profit is then allocated to the core functions, based on infor-
mation on costs. This ‘core’ profit is then distributed over a number of factors, such as 
R&D, marketing, production, and entrepreneurship. The part allocated to R&D then 
applies to the innovation box. The peeling method is applied in cooperation with the 
tax office. A third method is the cost-plus method, which identifies a standard cost level 
for the immaterial asset or R&D, and then uses a standard mark-up to determine the 
innovation box profits.
Several changes to the policy were introduced through the years. The first of these 
changes took place in 2008, i.e. 1 year after the policy started. Subsequently, changes 
were introduced every year up to 2013, with the exception of 2012. While the measure 
started as a patent box, i.e. only applied to projects that led to a patent, this requirement 
was dropped already in 2008, with the aim to make the policy more interesting for small 
and medium-sized firms. However, while the limit to the tax advantage for projects with 
a patent remained at four times the R&D costs, a harder €400,000 limit for projects 
without a patent was introduced. In 2009, the policy was changed to allow transfer of 
negative profits of the innovation project between years (both forward and backward in 
time). In 2010, the effective tax rate was lowered from 10 to 5 per cent, and all limits to 
the tax advantage were dropped. This mattered most for projects without a patent, as 
the limit for projects with a patent was almost never reached. Therefore, in effect, this 
greatly enhanced the opportunities for use of the policy without a patent. In the same 
year, the name was changed to innovation box. In 2011, profits that occurred after a 
patent was applied for but before the patent was granted were allowed to be included in 
the tax advantage. Finally, in 2013, a fourth and much simplified method was allowed 
to calculate the innovation profits, in addition to the three methods discussed above. 
Altogether, these changes imply that the policy has become more accessible to a larger 
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IV. A short introduction to the methods
A key factor in deciding about which method to use is the endogeneity of the innova-
tion box tax scheme. Whether or not a firm uses the policy is a voluntary decision. 
Firms who decide to use the policy will likely make this decision because of certain 
factors that are not shared with firms that do not use the policy. An observed increase 
in R&D for the users of the policy may well be the result of these specific factors, 
rather than of the policy itself. This is evident for the basic distinction between innova-
tors and non-innovators: non-innovators will be less likely to use the policy. If  we then 
compared policy-users and non-users in a naïve way, we could conclude that the policy 
works because users have a larger increase in R&D than non-users. But this conclu-
sion would be wrong, because the differences between innovators and non-innovators 
already existed before the policy was introduced.
From the point of view of evaluation, it would be better if  the use of the policy 
were determined in an exogenous way, e.g. in a lottery. In this way, differences between 
users and non-users of the policy could be made essentially random, so that it would 
be likely that actually observed differences in increase of R&D are the result of the 
policy. However, because the innovation box is not implemented in this way, we have 
to resort to econometric methods that control as much as possible for the endogene-
ity, but still enable us to draw conclusions about the effect of the policy. We apply a 
difference-in-differences method, which corrects as much as possible for selection bias 
and endogeneity.
We always use a balanced panel of firms, i.e. all firms in the analysis are available 
for the entire time period of the estimation. This reduces the number of observations, 
but gives higher reliability, because in an unbalanced panel the number of firms in the 
control group (non-users) would fluctuate strongly, which means that the users of the 
policy are compared to different firms for every period (year).
The difference-in-differences method is typically implemented in a situation where 
observations exist for two periods, one with and one without the policy. In this case, 
the difference-in-differences is implemented by a regression of the following kind, for 
a sample of firms:





it= + + + + +∑0 1 1 2 3 1 β ε .
 
(1)
Here, Y is the dependent variable by which we measure the effect of the policy (R&D), 
and Xj is a range of control variables. D1 is a dummy-variable equal to 1 for period 1 
(when the policy exists) and 0 for period 0 (when the policy does not exist and hence 
no firm uses the policy). B is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that use the policy 
(in period 1) and 0 for the control group of firms that do not use the policy (in either 
period). The estimated parameter b0 measures the average outcome (in terms of Y) 
for the control group in period 0. b0 + b1 is the average outcome for the control group 
in period 1. b2 is the difference between the control group and the users in period 0.   
This difference already exists before the policy is implemented, and is therefore not a 
part of the effect of the policy. b0 + b2 is the average outcome for users of the policy 
in period 0, while b0 + b1 + b2 + b3 is the average outcome for these firms in period 
1. The difference in outcome for users between period 0 and period 1 is therefore b1 + 
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difference-in-differences, measures the ‘additionality’ of the policy, which is the extra 
R&D performed as a result of the use of the policy.
In our case, data are available for more than two periods, which is why we imple-
ment a difference-in-differences method with more than one period of policy avail-
ability. There are two ways in which equation (1) can be transformed to such a multiple 
period case:














it= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑≠ ≥0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1γ τ α β ε ,
 
(2a)














it= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑≠ ≥0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1γ τ α β ε .
 
(2b)
GT is a dummy variable equal to 1 for a firm that starts using the policy in period T 
(0 remains the period without the policy, hence T can be equal to 1 or larger). DT 
is a dummy variable for time period T, while git is a dummy variable that indicates 
whether firm i uses the policy in period t.2 T0 represents the period just before the 
first use of  the policy, and T1 any other period after this. The parameters γ, τ, α and β 
are estimated. The γ parameters correct for differences between users and non-users 
that already existed before the introduction of  the policy, to the extent that these 
differences are not reflected in the set of  variables X. We use multiple γ parameters 
to enable a distinction between different categories of  users, such as early and late 
adopters of  the policy (non-users will have zero value for all G variables, hence no 
γ refers to them). In other words, we assume that firms that begin using the policy 
immediately after it has been introduced will differ from firms that start using the 
policy only after a few years. Because, as discussed in the previous section, several 
changes in the policy occurred, it is advisable to account for these differences. The α 
parameters measure the effect of  the innovation box policy. Instead of  just a single 
effect, we estimate one effect for each combination of  user-generation (G) and time 
period. For example, the parameter α0812 measures the effect of  the policy in 2012 on 
firms from the 2008 generation. A similar parameter (effect) is estimated for every 
possible combination of  period and generation.
In the firm’s decision about whether to increase R&D efforts as a result of the policy, 
several time lags may play a role. The profits that are relevant for the innovation box will 
generally occur after the innovation efforts took place. A completely rational firm will 
therefore make an estimate of the expected profits, the time lag at which they occur, and 
then compare the benefits including the innovation box with the innovation costs that 
have to be invested up front. In such a case, innovation box benefits in the future will 
affect current innovation efforts. However, because the innovation process is associated 
to strong uncertainties, it is also possible that firms decide in a different way, with a less 
strict role for the time lag between investment and pay-off. For example, the firm may 
use the innovation box benefit to contribute to innovation efforts in the current year.
Such ambiguities in the time structure of the effect lead us to experiment with two 
variations in the estimations below. First, we adopt the two alternative specifications 
(2a) and (2b). The difference between these specifications lies in the assumption about 
how long the effect of the innovation box policy lasts. Equation (2a) assumes that the 
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effect is limited to the time period in which the use of the policy occurs (of course the 
firm may use the policy in different years, so that an effect also occurs in multiple years). 
On the other hand, equation (2b) assumes that the firm will always have an effect as a 
result of a one-period use of the policy, even if  later it does not use the innovation box. 
The two specifications would be identical if  first-time users continued using the policy 
forever. Because there is a large persistency level in innovation box use, reality is actu-
ally close to such a situation.
Second, we introduce the so-called anticipation effect. This is inspired by the idea 
that expected future profits determine current R&D efforts, and hence that the use of 
the innovation box in period t can already affect R&D efforts in periods before t. As 
an approximation, the anticipation effect assumes that this time lag is exactly 1 year. 
We implement this by shifting the policy use (dummy) variable 1 year back in time, e.g. 
when a firm actually uses the innovation box in 2010, the anticipation effect specifica-
tion attributes the use to the year 2009. Note that if  the anticipation effect is relevant, 
but is not taken into account, the result may be that the actual effect of the policy is 
interpreted as an ex ante difference between users and non-users. We do not explore 
an anticipation effect longer than 1 year because this would eliminate almost a third 
of our observations. The β parameters articulate the differences between firms that are 
observable in terms of the variable set X. The τ parameters measure how the dependent 
variable varies over time, on average, and independent of the policy. Because the credit 
crisis of 2007 and the slow economic recovery following it are part of our analysis 
period, this is an important control variable.
We do not include spillover effects in the estimations, even if  it is well known in the 
literature (e.g. Griliches, 1992) that (additional) R&D by one firm can stimulate other 
firms to increase their R&D expenditure (assuming strategic complementarity), both 
within the same industry and in other industries. In fact, we assume that the spillovers 
affect all firms in the sample, and hence are not a part of the measured policy effect. We 
also do not attempt to estimate the policy-induced spillovers, i.e. the spillovers of the 
R&D generated by the policy, which will lead to an under-estimation of the estimated 
policy effect.
V. Data
We use a dataset that results from the other R&D tax credit measure in the Netherlands, 
WBSO (in later years also RDA, which is similar).3 For WBSO/RDA, firms have to 
supply information on the number of R&D person-hours on a yearly basis. For the 
period under analysis here, virtually all firms use WBSO/RDA, and hence the dataset 
provides an almost complete population of enterprises that do any kind of R&D in the 
Netherlands. This is in strong contrast to another potential dataset for our analysis, 
the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) as implemented by Statistics Netherlands. 
CIS is an often-used data source for innovation analysis, but it is based on a sample of 
firms, with samples being small especially for small and medium-sized firms. We tried 
3 As already explained, WBSO reduces the wage costs of R&D workers, whereas RDA are tax credits for 
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matching the CIS data with data on innovation box use, but were only able to match a 
small number of users. Therefore, we only present results for the WBSO dataset.
Data on the use of the innovation box policy is defined at the level of so-called tax-
units, which are legal entities used by the tax authorities for collection of the corporate 
income tax. The tax-units can be linked on a one-to-one basis to the statistical units 
used by Statistics Netherlands, which is the supplier of the data used in this study. 
However, neither useful economic data nor information about the use of the innovation 
box measure are available at these levels of tax-units and statistical units. Information 
about innovation box use comes at the level of tax entities, which are aggregations of 
tax-units. Statistical information comes at the level of enterprises, which are aggrega-
tions of statistical units. Although they are composed of the same kind of units, statisti-
cal enterprises are generally not identical to a tax entity.
In order to construct our dataset, we need to link the statistical enterprises to tax 
entities. Because these entities do not correspond to each other on a one-to-one basis, 
we need to make compromises in linking the data. For about half  (52 per cent) of all 
cases, we are able to make this link in a ‘pure’ way: there is a full coverage of all the 
units of the tax entities and all those of the statistical enterprises, hence a one-to-one 
match between tax entities and statistical enterprises. For 40 per cent of the remaining 
cases, there is only one tax entity for each statistical enterprise, but some of its units also 
belong to another statistical enterprise, i.e. there is some overlap between tax entities 
and statistical enterprises.
Table  1 gives summary statistics for the dependent variable (R&D person-hours). 
It is immediately seen that innovation box users have much higher R&D efforts than 
non-users. Interestingly, however, the number of R&D person-hours declines over time 
within the group of users, as well as in the group of non-users. In the user-group, this 
effect is especially large in the beginning, which indicates that the use of the innovation 
box in the early years was mainly a matter of a small group of very large firms.
Table 1: Summary statistics for the dependent variable (R&D person-hours)
Number of firms Average person-hours for R&D
Year Non-users Users Total Non-users Users Total










































Source: Statistics Netherlands microdata, processed by Dialogic/MERIT in September 2015. Numbers in 
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VI. Results
We use the natural logarithm of the number of person-hours spent on R&D as the 
dependent variable in the difference-in-differences estimations. We have no data for the 
year 2006, while the innovation box was introduced in 2007. Thus, strictly speaking, we 
have no data on the year preceding the introduction of the policy. We deal with this by 
eliminating from the dataset all firms that used the innovation box in 2007, thus effec-
tively making 2007 the reference year in which no firm used the innovation box.4 Since 
some changes to the patent (respectively innovation) box were introduced every year, we 
do multiple comparisons of difference-in-differences, namely we compare the users of 
every year from 2008 onwards to the firms that never used the patent box from 2007 to 
2013. We have (the natural logarithm of) the number of employees of the firm and a set 
of sector dummies as the control variables X in equations (2a) and (2b).
Table 2 documents the estimated parameters for the policy effects. Other estimated 
parameters are not documented in order to save space. The two columns refer to speci-
fication (2a), i.e. assuming the policy has a cumulative effect. In the first column we 
estimate the model under the assumption of no anticipation effect. This column finds 
a positive and significant effect for just about half  of the combinations of user-gener-
ations and time periods. This indicates that for these periods, the specified user-gen-
erations actually carried out more R&D than the control group, or, in other words, 
that the policy was effective. The large majority of these cases is found in the years 
2012 and 2013. Before 2012, the innovation box seems not so effective. The size of the 
effects is fairly large. Because the dependent variable is in natural logs, the documented 
effects can approximately be interpreted as percentage effects. The next column gives 
the results for the anticipation effect specification. This column shows 12 significant 
positive effects, one fewer than without an anticipation effect. Otherwise, there are no 
strong indications that the models with or without anticipation effects yield different 
results. We have also estimated the model under specification (2a) and no anticipation.5 
In that case we obtain only eight significant coefficients.
We also experimented with propensity score matching as an alternative evaluation 
method. However, since we have few control variables that we can rely on to construct 
the counterfactuals, it is difficult to dissociate the endogenous selection from the true 
effect of the patent/innovation box. The propensity score method yields higher effects, 
but they are for instance smaller already when we restrict the control group to firms that 
at least once over the sample period have used the patent/innovation box. We have more 
confidence in the method of difference-in-differences and continue the analysis with the 
results reported in Table 2.
In order to get a better insight into the size of the policy effects, we summarize 
the most important results in a graphical way. The first step is to transparently docu-
ment the benchmark against which the innovation box use is evaluated. This is done 
in Figure 1, which gives the predicted number of R&D person-hours for the different 
generations of innovation box users, and non-users, over time. The figure assumes that 
the innovation box never existed (i.e. the α parameters are set to zero) and uses average 
firm size and no sector-effects. It is based on the first column of Table 2.
4 Only 40 firms out of 10,953 made use of the patent box in 2007.
5 The fact that so few firms used the patent box at the beginning (see Table 1) shows that there is little 








aastricht user on 14 O
ctober 2021
Evaluating the innovation box tax policy instrument in the Netherlands, 2007–13 151
The lines in the figure are the sum of a yearly effect (equal to all groups of firms), 
a generation effect (G, non-existent for the non-user category), and a size effect (for 
every group, the yearly average within the group was used). The resulting differences 
between the groups of firms are sizeable, which means that it is important to eliminate 
Table  2: Difference-in-differences estimation results (only policy effects, by year and generation of 
users)
(1) (2)
Generation of users (G) Year (t) No anticipation Anticipation
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these differences from the actual effect of the policy. The group of non-users has the 
lowest R&D effort over the entire period. Thus, simply comparing non-users and users 
in order to estimate the policy effect gives a strongly distorted picture. Such differences 
are also observed between the different generations of users. The first generation (G08) 
has the highest R&D effort. The next three generations (G09, G10, and G11) are not 
much different, but the last two generations (G12 and G13) exert clearly still a lower 
R&D effort even in the absence of the patent box than the previous three generations 
of first users. So it is clear from Figure 2 that the higher the R&D effort, the earlier the 
firms make use of the patent box. This is broadly consistent with our review of changes 
in the innovation box policy in section III.
Figure 2 (also based on the first column of Table 2) shows the most elementary represen-
tation of the policy effects. Each sub-figure compares the R&D effort inclusive of the policy 
effect of an average user firm with the counter-factual of no innovation box use. The latter 
benchmark is taken from Figure 1. As we see, every successive generation of first users starts 
from a lower benchmark, but follows a similar counterfactual evolution of R&D person-
hours in the absence of the patent/innovation box policy. The 2008 generation of first users 
does not change its R&D efforts until the year 2010, when the innovation box was intro-
duced. The policy effect is most clearly visible for the generation of 2009, where the dotted 
line is always above the solid line. This is also the case for later generations, but here there are 
fewer years with innovation box use available. In general, the figures clearly show the nature 
of the 2010 extension of the patent box to the innovation box: it is mostly a compensation 
of a downward trend that shows in the benchmark after 2010. It is also seen that the effect 
is often substantial in terms of the number of R&D person-hours.
In order to better understand the policy effects, we calculate the so-called bang-for-
the-buck (BFTB) measure. This terminology is commonly used in the Dutch policy 
debate to express the effect of R&D incentive policies in terms of additional R&D as a 
fraction of the forgone tax income for the government. A BFTB value of 1 would imply 
that for every euro of forgone tax income, an additional euro of R&D is undertaken by 
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the firm. BFTB lower (higher) than 1 indicates that less (more) R&D is generated by the 
policy than forgone tax income.
In our dataset, we have no data on R&D expenditures, only on R&D person-hours. In 
order to convert R&D person-hours to R&D expenditure, we first estimate a regression 
model for R&D expenditures using the CIS dataset. The model includes as explanatory 
variables R&D person-hours and all control variables used in the difference-in-differ-
ences model, which means that we can ‘predict’ R&D out-of-sample, i.e. for all firms in 
the dataset used for Table 2. In this model, we also include interaction effects between 
the independent variables in order to maximize the fit. The (out-of-sample) predictions 
are used to calculate the BFTB in the following way. The extra R&D person-hours due 
to the innovation box are estimated, per firm, using the estimates of Table 2 and then 
Figure 2: Innovation box effects on different user generations against the benchmark of no use, 
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expressed as a percentage of the total estimated R&D person-hours of the firm in the 
same model (Table 2). This percentage is applied to the out-of-sample predicted R&D 
expenditure of the firm in the same year, which gives us the ‘bang’ in the BFTB. We 
use the firm’s own generational effect, which implies that the total sample ‘bang’ is a 
weighted average for all user generations. The ‘buck’ is the innovation box tax deduc-
tion in the same year (in case of the anticipation effect, the ‘buck’ is also advanced by 
1 year). The average BFTB that will be reported is obtained by dividing the ‘bang’ by 
the ‘buck’.
The BFTB values in Table 3 range from 0.07 to 0.84. The higher values, 0.73 and 0.84, 
are found for 2012, which is consistent with the previous impression that the strongest 
effect is found for the later years (for 2013, no R&D expenditure is available, so no BFTB 
can be estimated). In 2009, the model without anticipation effect also estimates a high 
BFTB, and 2011 yields relatively high values for both estimates. The brief summary of 
changes of the measure that we presented in section III suggests that the policy becomes 
more accessible for a broad population of firms (e.g. because the requirement of a patent 
is dropped). The relatively high BFTB values for the two most recent years may indicate 
that this leads to a stronger effect of the policy, although the changes over time in Table 3 
remain somewhat erratic, and therefore do not warrant a very strong conclusion.
All values in the table are below 1. This means that the extra R&D generated by the 
innovation box policy is less than the forgone tax income. In other words, firms do 
not transform every euro of tax credit into extra R&D. The model specifications with 
anticipation effect do not yield qualitatively different results than without anticipation. 
The average values for 2008–12 are about one-half  (without anticipation) or one-third 
(with anticipation).
A BFTB lower than 1 is the most common result in the literature, although some 
studies find values (much) above 1. The summary table in Straathof et al. (2014, p. 33) 
documents 10 estimated values for the BFTB for a range of countries and time periods. 
Of these 10 values, four are equal to 1 or larger, and the remaining six are positive but 
smaller than 1.6 For the Netherlands, a number of studies have documented the BFTB 
for the WBSO instrument. Two studies document BFTB>1: de Jong and Verhoeven 
(2007) report BFTB equal to 1.72, and Verhoeven et al. (2012) find 1.77. Two other 
studies find BFTB<1: Cornet and Vroomen (2005) report BFTB equal to 0.15 (general) 
or 0.65 (start-ups), and Lokshin and Mohnen (2012) find 0.54.
Table 3: Estimated BFTB for innovation box







Notes: For calculation method see main text. # In 2010 a different model was used to estimate R&D expendi-
tures (less interaction terms; the standard model yielded many negative estimates).
6 The magnitude of the BFTB depends on the way it is calculated and on the type of R&D tax incentive. 
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The fact that the BFTG is found to be lower than 1 can be explained in the following 
way. The patent/innovation box is an ex post reward for successful R&D. It can stimu-
late firms to do more R&D, but it is not warranted that the R&D will lead to patents (in 
the case of the patent box) or be eligible for the patent or the innovation box because of 
restrictions attached to it (the R&D must have been declared previously, the R&D must 
be done at home . . .). Moreover, it is not straightforward to isolate the revenues that can 
benefit from the innovation box. Therefore the stimulus to do more R&D is probably 
lower than with an equal amount of ex ante tax incentives, the more so as the return to 
R&D in terms of patents or other revenues is expected to be low.
VII. Discussion and conclusions
We performed a micro-econometric evaluation of the Dutch innovation box policy 
instrument. These instruments, generally known as ‘patent boxes’, have been argued 
to lead to tax-shifting behaviour and tax competition between countries. Our evalua-
tion is the first available one based on a micro analysis. The available macro evidence 
(Alstadsæter et al., 2015) suggests that tax-shifting behaviour does occur in the case 
of patent boxes, although the specific design of the instrument may counteract this. 
In particular, the requirement that the tax advantage must be linked to the firm’s own 
(therefore local) R&D activity may mitigate the role of patent boxes in tax shifting. The 
Dutch case that we analysed has such a local content requirement, and therefore we can 
look at our case as a test of whether such requirements can be effectively implemented.
We find that the innovation box has a positive effect. Firms that use the policy instru-
ment tend to have higher R&D activities after they start using the innovation box. This 
result is obtained in a difference-in-differences estimation, which represents the best possi-
ble way that we can account for endogeneity of the policy use and the selection bias that is 
associated to this. A sensitivity analysis using a different method (propensity score match-
ing) indeed shows that the choice of method matters, as we obtain stronger positive effects 
with the propensity score matching. However, we prefer the difference-in-differences esti-
mations because they are a priori expected to yield a purer cleaning of the selection bias.
We calculate a ‘bang-for-the-buck’ (BFTB) that measures the extra R&D generated 
by the policy instrument per euro of forgone taxes. The BFTB that we find varies over 
the years, but is generally positive and smaller than 1. Hence we conclude that there 
is additionality of the innovation box measure, but only at a modest level. Although 
the measure is effective in generating extra R&D, it does so to a lesser extent than the 
costs that are involved in terms of forgone taxes. The patent/innovation box is thus an 
effective measure to stimulate additional domestic R&D, but it is not efficient in terms 
of cost–benefit analysis. A proper cost–benefit analysis would also include the admin-
istration and application costs as well as the deadweight loss from taxation on the cost 
side, and the positive R&D externalities on the benefit side. Our expectation is that the 
latter would have to be substantial to overcome the various costs and turn the measure 
to be welfare improving. We leave this for further research. But, on the other hand, 
the BFTB values that we obtain are broadly in line with those obtained for tax credit 
policy schemes of a different nature than a patent box, in a range of countries. This 








aastricht user on 14 O
ctober 2021
Pierre Mohnen, Arthur Vankan, and Bart Verspagen156
credit instruments that are not of a patent box nature. We therefore conclude that it is 
indeed very well possible ‘to mitigate the role of patent boxes as new tax competition 
tools’ (Alstadsæter et al., 2015, p. 23). At least when implemented as in the Netherlands, 
the patent/innovation box policy is a way to limit the R&D tax incentive to domestic 
R&D, to include R&D that is not patent-bound, and yet to restrict the R&D support 
to successful R&D (which is not the case with ex ante tax incentives). It would be 
interesting to compare, in a full cost–benefit analysis, the ex post innovation box tax 
incentive with the more traditional level-based ex ante tax incentive measure (WBSO in 
the Netherlands) and to find out whether the presence of both measures within a policy 
mix is justified.
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